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This paper links the old literature on employment subsidies with the current theories
of contract and regulation. One important source of ineﬃciency of employment subsidies
is deadweight spending. This refers to the cases in which private ﬁrms receive a subsidy for
employment creation that would have been reached without this ﬁnancial support. We identify
the asymmetry of information between the regulator and the private ﬁrm as the source of this
deadweight spending. The private ﬁrm knows its hiring capability while the government does
not. We then derive the optimal incentive contracts for the regulator. In these contracts
deadweight spending is reduced to the information rent to private ﬁrms. We derive conditions
for which this deadweight spending is zero.
R´ esum´ e
Dans cet article, nous entreprenons de relier la litt´ erature sur les subsides ` a l’emploi aux
th´ eories de la r´ egulation et des contrats. Une importante source d’ineﬃcience lors de l’octroi
des subsides ` a l’emploi est l’eﬀet d’aubaine. Cet eﬀet apparaˆ ıt d` es que des ﬁrmes priv´ ees
re¸ coivent un subside pour des emplois qui auraient ´ et´ ec r ´ e´ es sans ce subside. Nous identiﬁons
la source de cet eﬀet dans l’asymm´ etrie d’information entre le gouvernement et la ﬁrme. Une
ﬁrme priv´ ee est capable d’´ evaluer sa capacit´ e d’embauche alors que le gouvernement n’a pas
acc` es ` a cette information. En construisant les subsides ` a l’emploi comme des contrats incitatifs,
nous r´ eduisons l’eﬀet d’aubaine au niveau d’une rente d’information laiss´ ee aux ﬁrmes priv´ ees
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1 Introduction
The persistence of unemployment in modern economies leads governments to intervene in the labour
market. A signiﬁcant part of these interventions is made on the demand side of the labour market
in the form of employment subsidies to private ﬁrms. Actually, this subsidy seems increasingly
justiﬁed since, as Phelps (1994) and Snower (1994) explain, it is a means to intervene on the direct
cause of unemployment while avoiding the harmful eﬀect of the welfare system.
A ﬁrst discussion on employment subsidies is proposed by Kaldor (1976) who analyses the
macroeconomic implications of a general employment subsidy. This type of subsidy reduces the
labour cost of each worker in each ﬁrm. It appears to be very costly since it is paid for jobs
that already exist in ﬁrms. To reduce this eﬀect, Layard & Nickell (1980) propose a marginal
employment subsidy (MES). This subsidy is is paid only for new job creations. As it applies only
to a small fraction of the overall work force, the MES leads to a substantial saving in public outlay.
The Layard & Nickell’s approach does not consider the long run and dynamic aspects. However,
Luskin (1986) shows that the long run impact of the MES is weaker than what Layard & Nickell
present. Indeed as the private ﬁrms make no proﬁt in the long run, their average costs equal their
product price. Since the MES has a signiﬁcant impact on the marginal cost but not on the average
cost, its eﬀect on output and employment remains very weak in the long run. Steinherr (1985) &
Michel (1990) analyze the dynamic implications of the MES. They show how the private ﬁrms will
increase the job turnover in order to beneﬁt more from the MES. However the beneﬁt from this
type of subsidy is still substantial when compared to the general subsidy introduced by Kaldor.
Beside these criticisms, the issue of deadweight spending is questioned by Layard and Nickell.
As they conclude in their paper, ”the performance of the marginal employment subsidy depends
on the size of the deadweight spending to jobs that would have been provided anyway” (p.67).
Deadweight spending is also called windfall gain or non-additional spending (H.M. Treasury (1988,
p.26)). In fact the deadweight spending is measured as the part of subsidy that is not strictly
required to make the ﬁrm hire a new employee: this employee would have been hired with a lower
subsidy. The complement of deadweight spending is the transfer with no deadweight or minimal
transfer. This is the smallest transfer with which the regulator is able to attain a desired level of
employment: this could not have been achieved without the subsidy. From another point of view,
the transfer with no deadweight corresponds to the contract that makes the ﬁrm indiﬀerent to the
”null contract” in which no transfer is provided and no employment increase is obtained. Any unit
of transfer beyond the minimal transfer is a deadweight transfer.
The problem for the government and its agency is to avoid the deadweight spending. But is
this administratively possible? ”Unfortunately not”, Layard and Nickell reply. ”For it requires
that the government can get ﬁrms to report truthfully what their employment would have been in
the absence of the subsidy” (p.52). The source of the deadweight spending must be found in the
asymmetry of information between the private ﬁrm. The government agency is not able to select
the private ﬁrms and the government since the latter does not know the true hiring capabilities of
private ﬁrms.
Economic researches on subsidies usually focus on the full information setting. For instance,
Holden & Swales (1993) assess the eﬃciency of this relationship in a full information setting. They
relate the cost-per-job with the characteristics of the technology and the demand for the produced
good. In this full information setting there is no deadweight spending. However, in the real
regulatory situation, the government or its agency has neither the legitimacy nor the time to audit
each private ﬁrm in order to assess accurately its true hiring capability.
The government must set up institutions or devices that induce the private ﬁrms to reveal their
true hiring capabilities. In this paper we construct employment subsidies as incentive contracts that
maximize the government’s socio-economic objective under the constraint that the ﬁrms reveal their
true hiring capabilities. Such incentive contracts enable the government to reduce the deadweight
spending. In some particular situations it will even be eliminated. Incentive contracts are often
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used in the theory of regulation. In this sense, the current paper links the old literature on
employment subsidies to the current theories of regulation and contract.
In the present paper we mainly extend the general employment subsidy proposed by Kaldor to
the context of asymmetric information. The government never observes the level of employment
before the date of application of the subsidy. He is then unable to infer the increase in employment
due to the subsidy. He must pay the ﬁrm on the basis of total employment as in the general
employment subsidy. We devote however small extension on the MES introduced by Layard &
Nickell. The government can then observe ex-ante the level of employment in the ﬁrm. He bases
its incentive contracts on increase in employment. We however focus on the ﬁrst extension for two
reasons: ﬁrstly, we believe in Luskin’s argument that MES scheme is not eﬃcient in the long run
and secondly we ﬁnd that ex-ante observation introduces strategic behaviors on the ﬁrm’s part
that are out of the scope of this work.
Whereas the present paper focuses on the problem of deadweight spending, three other eﬀects
must be assessed to measure the actual impact of employment subsidies. There are the substitution
eﬀect that can take place between subsidized and non-subsidized workers inside ﬁrms (Van der Lin-
den (1995)) and the activity displacement eﬀect that occurs between subsidized and non-subsidized
ﬁrms operating in the same industry (Holden & Swales (1995)). Finally there is the eﬀect of non-
additional employment from which deadweight spending should be distinguished. Non-additional
employment concerns the number of new jobs that would have been created without the subsidy.
Deadweight spending relates to the part of subsidy that is not strictly required to make the ﬁrm
hire new employees.
In the static (one shot) analysis developed here, the issue of non-additional employment is not
relevant. Any job creation is indeed additional provided that the private ﬁrm is at equilibrium. If
a job creation were non-additional, the ﬁrm could have created the job without any transfer from
the government. However, why didn’t the ﬁrm create the job while it was optimal to do so at
equilibrium? This is a contradiction. In fact, employment non-additionality becomes relevant only
in a dynamic or strategic framework. The paper will focus only on deadweight spending.
Deadweight spending and employment non-additionality are important eﬀects. Three studies
by Hamermesh (1978), Foley (1992) and Van der Linden (1995) show the very large proportion of
non-additional jobs against the total jobs created by various subsidies - 50 to 80 percent - during
the last decade. Deadweight spending is in the same proportion. Being aware of the importance
of deadweight spending we can now explain the model and the results of the paper.
In this paper we consider an economy characterized by involuntary unemployment due to labour
market imperfections. Formally we allow for these imperfections by introducing a wedge between
the market wage and the socially optimal shadow wage. The government and its agency is modeled
as a regulator that is in charge to promote employment in private ﬁrms. He takes maximizes the
expected social welfare that takes into account the consumer and producer surpluses, as well as
the social cost of public funding and the welfare valuation of employment through the wage wedge
(D r ` eze & Stern (1987)).
In this partial equilibrium analysis, the private ﬁrm adjusts its level of employment as to
maximize its proﬁt. All other factors of production are exogenously ﬁxed to the ﬁrm. The regulator
is ignorant about the productivity parameter of the ﬁrms applying to the subsidy. This introduces
an asymmetry of information between the private ﬁrm and the regulator as in the models of
Fudenberg & Tirole (1993). A main diﬀerence is that the reservation proﬁts - i.e. the minimum
proﬁts for the ﬁrms to participate into the subsidy scheme - vary with the productivity parameter
of the ﬁrm.
We show how the problem of deadweight spending is related to the concept of asymmetric infor-
mation. When the regulator introduces incentive contracts to promote employment, the deadweight
spending is minimized and equals the information rent, i.e. the part of transfer granted to the ﬁrm
to reveal its true information. In some situations this rent may even be zero. We characterize one
class of contracts where the deadweight spending is equal to the expected information rent and
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two other classes where no information rents are required so that there is no deadweight spending.
In our analysis, the ﬁrms with the highest hiring capabilities beneﬁt from the information rents
and are the cause of deadweight spending. The ﬁrms with the lowest capability are disregarded
by the regulator. The latter is not willing to promote the employment in these ﬁrms as he prefers
to pay for the ﬁrm with the highest hiring capability.
In the hypotheses of our model, the ﬁrms with the highest hiring capability are the most
competitive ﬁrms in their product markets. When the regulator applies the prescribed incentive
contracts, he indirectly generates some pick-the-winner strategy by overpayment for these market
stars. Incentive contracts are, however, intrinsically diﬀerent from this type of strategy. In the
pick-the-winner strategy, the regulator has complete information about each ﬁrm’s characteristics
and deliberately chooses the market stars. Within our model, it is the existence of asymmetric
information that makes him reward the winner with an extra-proﬁt - the information rent.
Note that this paper shows that in the context of asymmetric information deadweight spending
is not synonymous to ineﬃciency. Indeed, the cases in which the regulator pays an information
rent and therefore a deadweight, is constrained eﬃcient given the information at the disposal of
the regulator.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 sets the assumptions of the model. Section
3 describes to the full information case. Section 4 proceeds with the construction of incentive
contracts in the asymmetric information context. It discusses cases for which the full information
contract can still be attained and pinpoints the information rent as the source of the deadweight
transfer. The results are collected in three classes of contracts and an example is provided. The
Section 4 considers the case of an ex-ante observation by the regulator and the last section suggests
the possible extensions to our model.
2 The Model
2.1 The Private Firm
In the real world, the information about the private ﬁrm’s hiring capability is hidden to the
regulator. The private ﬁrm has usually better knowledge about its parameters of production than
the regulator, it is more able to assess its hiring capability. When it is the case we say that there
is an asymmetry of information between the ﬁrm and the regulator.
In this text we will make four assumptions on this asymmetric information. First, it can be
summarized in one dimension, that we call the ﬁrm’s type θ. Secondly, there are two realizations
of this type, (θl,θ h) where θl and θh are the lowest and highest types: θl <θ h. Thirdly, the type θ
will be restricted to describe some parameter of the production technology so that the production
function depends on the type θ and the level of employment L: Q = Q(θ,L). The function Q(θ,L)
is increasing and strictly concave in L. We assume ﬁnally that the type θ ranks the production
schedule positively :
∂
∂θ Q(θ,L) > 0 (1)
The current paper focuses on the distortion introduced by the labour market. To focus on this
distortion, we assume that the private ﬁrm is perfectly competitive and sells its product Q at a
price P ﬁxed by the product market. The revenue from sales is then PQ (θ,L).
The ﬁrm has a homogeneous work force (same skills, same weekly work hours per employee) and
the wage w is exogenously ﬁxed in the labour market. The private ﬁrm’s proﬁt has the following
form:
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Π=PQ (θ,L) − wL+ t (2)
where the right hand side terms denote the revenue PQ (θ,L), the cost of labour wL and the
transfer t granted by the regulator. By the hypothesis on Q(θ,L), the revenue is concave in L.1
Finally we make use of the Single Crossing Property for the ﬁrm’s proﬁt: d
dθ
ΠL
Πt > 0. As the
proﬁt is linear in t and the wage w is ﬁxed, this yields:
∂
2
∂L∂θ PQ(θ,L) > 0∀L (3)
With this hypothesis2, the parameter θ must be chosen such that it monotonically ranks the
values of each ﬁrm’s marginal revenues of labour (or returns to scale of labour). The higher the
type, the higher the marginal revenue. Examples of such kinds of asymmetric information are the
marginal productivity and the staﬀ performance.
When the ﬁrm is free from regulation, it receives no transfer and maximizes its proﬁt. The
following ﬁrst order condition yields the level of employment LF:
PQL(θ,LF)=w
By the strict concavity of the revenue, this yields a unique maximum at the level of employment
LF(θ), and the proﬁt, ΠF(θ) that depend on the ﬁrm’s type θ. For conciseness we will denote
these values as the free level of employment and the free proﬁt.
By the hypotheses on production function, the free levels of employment and the free proﬁts





h. This property is important as the free proﬁt levels will be used to
determine the reservation value of the ﬁrm when it makes its decision to participate to the subsidy
scheme.
2.2 The Regulator
The regulator operates in an economy with involuntary unemployment caused by distortions in
the labour market. To model this we assume that the market wage w is larger than some shadow
wage ws. This justiﬁes the existence of an excess supply of labour. The intensity of this distortion
is denoted by w
ws ≥ 1.
Suppose for the time being that the regulator can distinguish each type of ﬁrm. This will be
relax at the end of this section. His objective is then deﬁned as :
W = PQ(θ,L) − wsL − λt (4)
where the PQ(θ,L) denotes the gross consumer surplus provided by the production Q(θ,L)
in each ﬁrm. The group of terms PQ(θ,L) − wsL(θ) is what we will call the social surplus.I t
consists of the social surplus that would be reached if the price of labour was set at the shadow
wage, ws. The term −λt is the welfare loss incurred by a transfer t from the tax payer to the ﬁrm.
The social welfare eﬀect of this transfer is negative because of the use of distortionary taxes on
1In the following text, we will often discuss the properties of the revenue PQ (θ,L) instead of those of the pro-
duction function Q(θ,L). The reason is that our results on competitive ﬁrms can be easily extended to monopolistic
ﬁrms if we use the revenue function.
2The following weaker condition is suﬃcient in this paper: (PQ(θh,L h) − PQ(θh,L l)) − (PQ(θl,L h) −
PQ(θl,L l)) > 0
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income, capital and consumption to ﬁnance the transfer. The parameter λ reﬂects this distortion
and is called the shadow cost of public fund.3 We assume that λ>0.
A basic element of this model is the shadow wage ws. It captures the marginal social costs
associated with unemployment. For instance it includes the social cost of the workers’ loss of leisure
time, the social cost of the distortion in the labour market or the social cost of the unemployment
beneﬁt ﬁnancing.4. The rigorous estimate of ws should be addressed with the methodology of Cost
and Beneﬁt Analysis (See Dr` eze & Stern (1987))
We note that, by hypothesis, the consumer surplus PQ(θ,L) and the social surplus, PQ(θ,L)−
wsL(θ), are concave in L.
Finally given that the regulator has only some belief (p,1−p) on the possible realization of the
ﬁrm’s type, its objective is then the expectation of the social welfare.
3 The Full Information Contracts
When he has full information about the type of ﬁrm he faces, the regulator is able to propose a
distinct optimal contract (L∗(θ),t ∗(θ)) to each type. In this section we characterize this full infor-
mation contract and we relate it to the issues of deadweight transfers and non constant reservation
proﬁts.
For each type, the regulator maximizes its objective given the participation constraint (PC)
that imposes a proﬁt above the free proﬁt ΠF. This gives the following program where the reference
to the type θ can be temporarily discarded:
max
{L,t}
PQ(L) − wsL − λt
s. t. (PC): PQ(L) − wL+ t ≥ ΠF
Since the transfer t is costly to the regulator and appears linearly in the program, it will be
minimized by making the voluntary participation constraint (PC) binding. (Any transfer that
does not make this constraint binding can be lowered without modifying the required level of
employment. It is a gain for the regulator since the transfer can be lowered while the employment
level and thus the social surplus remain constant.) At the full information level of employment L∗,
the transfer is
t∗ =Π F − (PQ(L∗) − wL∗) (5)
It consists of the compensation for the ﬁrm’s loss associated with the increased work force, that
is the diﬀerence between the free proﬁt and the (out of transfer) proﬁt achieved under the contract.
The program simpliﬁes to
max
L
[PQ(L) − wsL − λ(ΠF − (PQ(L) − wL))]
that yields the following ﬁrst order condition:
PQL(L∗) − ws = λ(w − PQL(L∗)) (6)
3See Atkinson & Stiglitz (1980).
4The latter equals −λb
(¯ L−L)
¯ L where b is the unemployment beneﬁt and where
(¯ L−L)
¯ L is the proportion of
unemployed workers (¯ L − L) in the active population ¯ L. The marginal social cost is therefore captured by λb
¯ L
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By this equality, the marginal social surplus should equate the marginal cost of the transfer that
makes the private ﬁrm voluntarily participate. In order to make the ﬁrm participate, the regulator
is required to compensate for the productivity loss caused by the higher level of employment.5






This equality shows that, by concavity of Q(L), the full information level of employment L∗
is higher than the free level LF. The economic intuition goes as follows. The regulator tries to
correct the ﬁrm’s perceived wage to the level of the shadow wage ws. It does not however reach
that level due to the shadow cost λ of ﬁnancing the transfer t∗.6
From this last identity and the previous results, we can draw the following proposition:
Proposition 1. The full information contract (L∗,t ∗) is the solution of equations (7) and (5).
The full information level of employment is L∗ = L∗
l (w,ws,λ;θ). It decreases with lower ws, with
higher λ and with lower θ. The transfer involves no deadweight. .
Proof: In equation (7), the concavity of Q(θ,L) implies that any decrease in ws and θ should
increase L∗. The eﬀect of λ is opposite. The transfer includes no deadweight since the ﬁrm’s proﬁt
is always reduced to participation level. The ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between participating or not.
Q.E.D
The full information level of employment L∗ decreases with higher shadow cost of public fund
λ. A less expensive public ﬁnancing context decreases the social cost of transfer as compared to
the social beneﬁts from employment creation. The regulator’s trade-oﬀ will be to increase L∗ and
to raise slightly this cost. Besides, the level of employment L∗ increases with higher intensity of
the distortion in the labour market w
ws, higher distortions requiring stronger interventions from the
regulator. Finally a higher production parameter θ will yield higher marginal revenues and thus
more job creation in the ﬁrm.
The full information allocation can be presented in the following ﬁgure. The transfers to the
ﬁrms, t, are represented on the vertical axis, and the levels of employment, L , on the horizontal
axis. The upward sloping curve, ΠF, is the iso-proﬁt curve when the ﬁrm is free from regulation.
As the transfers enter linearly in the proﬁt, the iso-proﬁt curves are invariant to vertical translation.
The higher the proﬁt the higher the iso-proﬁt curve.
The regulator is characterized by concave indiﬀerence curves such as W. The higher the
regulator’s objective the lower the curve. The full information level of employment appears at the
tangency point T of the two types of curves.
In this full information context, we must notice that the absence of deadweight transfer does
not imply social eﬃciency. As the ﬁgure shows, there are two contracts with no deadweight: (L,ta)
and (L∗,t ∗). The ﬁrm is always indiﬀerent between these contracts and no contract. However, only
the full information contract (L∗,t ∗) is eﬃcient since it leads to the eﬃcient level of employment.
Unfortunately the full information contract can not be implemented by the regulator. Due to
the existence of hidden information in the private ﬁrm, he is not able to characterize completely
the behavior of the ﬁrm. The regulator must build incentive contracts in order to maximize his
objective given this informational restriction. This is the purpose of the next section.
5Since by hypothesis PQ(θ,L) − wsL(θ) and PQ (θ,L) are concave in L, one can readily show that the second
order condition is met and that (w − PQL(θ,L)) ≥ 0a tL = L∗ and thus LF ≤ L∗.
6This full information allocation is second best. A ﬁrst best allocation would be achieved when there regulator
would place no value on the losses in the private ﬁrm. That would mean that λ → 0. So, PQ(θ,Lfb)=ws and
Lfb >L ∗ for any λ>0.
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Figure 1:
Figure 2:
4 Incentive Contracts under asymmetric Information
Suppose now that the regulator is no longer informed about the ﬁrm’s type θ. What contracts
can he give to the ﬁrm in order to maximize his objective? How important will be the induced
deadweight transfers? The regulator can propose the following game to the ﬁrm:
In this one shot game, the regulator proposes a menu {Ci} of two contracts CL =( Ll,t l) and
CH =( Lh,t h) without knowing the true state of nature. Then nature moves by selecting θl or θh
with the probabilities (p,1 − p). The private ﬁrm is informed about the selected type and moves
in last place; it either selects one of the two contracts or chooses not to participate i.e. it chooses
the free proﬁt ΠF. Finally the contracted levels of employment and transfers are realized.
The regulator maximizes the expected welfare gains subject to the participation constraints
(PC) and the incentive compatibility constraints (IC). The latter reﬂects that one type of ﬁrm
is enticed not to mimic the other. Consequently it reveals its true type through the choice of the
contract. This is an adverse selection problem with the unusual speciﬁcity that it includes non
constant reservation values ΠF(θ). To our knowledge this speciﬁcity has never been discussed in
a two types adverse selection model.7 The problem is that it may modify the binding incentive
compatible constraints. This will be checked in the next sections. The program can be written in
the following way:
7See Fudenberg & Tirole (1993) p.263 for more detail and refer to Champsaur & Rochet (1989) for the same
speciﬁcity with a continuum of types.
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PIC : max
{Ll,Lh,tl,th}
p[PQ(θl,L l) − wsLl − λtl]+( 1− p)[PQ(θh,L h) − wsLh − λth]s . t .
PCh : PQ(θh,L h) − wLh + th ≥ ΠF
h
PCl : PQ(θl,L l) − wLl + tl ≥ ΠF
l
ICh : PQ(θh,L h) − wLh + th ≥ PQ(θh,L l) − wLl + tl
ICl : PQ(θl,L l) − wLl + tl ≥ PQ(θl,L h) − wLh + th
where ΠF
h =Π ( θh,L F(θh)) and ΠF
l =Π ( θl,L F(θl)).
4.1 The Full Information Contract
In this section we will derive the condition that allows the regulator to oﬀer the full information
contract. This will be the class (a).
Class a Let us deﬁne the pooling level of employment LP such that the minimal transfers that
makes the ﬁrms indiﬀerent to participate are equal for both types. At a level of employment L,
the minimal transfer to any ﬁrm is given by the following expression:
tF
i =Π F − (PQ(θi,L i) − wLi) i = l,h
Equating the minimal transfers tF
h = tF
l at LP yields the following implicit expression:
[PQ(θh,L P) − ΠF
h]=[ PQ(θl,L P) − ΠF
l ] (8)
The pooling level of employment is positively correlated to the θl and θh. It depends also on
w through ΠF
l and ΠF
h.S oLP = LP(w;θl,θ h). 8
We are now able to express the condition for a class (a) contract in the following proposition:




h)}. This contract solves
the program PIC if and only if L∗
l ≤ LP. In this situation, there is no deadweight transfer.
Proof:




h ≥ PQ(θh,L ∗
l ) − wL∗
l + t∗
l
Using the expression (5) for the transfers t∗
l and t∗
h , we get
ΠF
h ≥ ΠF
l + PQ(θh,L ∗
l ) − PQ(θl,L ∗
l )
By the deﬁnition of LP
l this can be transformed in
0 ≥ (PQ(θh,L ∗
l ) − PQ(θl,L ∗
l )) − (PQ(θh,L P) − PQ(θl,L P))
By the Single Crossing Property this is satisﬁed if and only if L∗
l ≤ LP.
8The reader can check that, by the Single Crossing Property, LP increases as the parameter of productivity θl
and θh increase.
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Figure 3:
At the full information allocation, the constraint ICl is
PQ(θl,L ∗
l ) − wLl + t∗




Using the same reasoning, we can reduce it to
0 ≥ (PQ(θl,L ∗
h) − PQ(θh,L ∗
h)) − (PQ(θl,L P
l ) − PQ(θh,L P
l )
.
Again, by the Single Crossing Property this is satisﬁed only and only if LP ≤ L∗
h. The reader
can check that, by construction, LP takes value in the range [LF
l ,L F




h ,w eh a v eLP ≤ L∗
h and the constraint is always satisﬁed.
Q.E.D
This proposition deﬁnes the menu of contracts {(al),(ah)} that we depict in the following ﬁgure.
The proﬁt are represented by the iso-proﬁt curves ΠF
l and ΠF
h. Larger proﬁts will yield higher
iso-proﬁt curves. By (1) the iso-proﬁt curve of the lowest type is drawn at low levels of employment
L (to the left), while the highest type’s is drawn at high levels (to the right). By deﬁnition, the




The free proﬁt iso-curves ΠF
h and ΠF
l represent also the participation constraints PC. They
depict the minimal transfers that make the ﬁrms indiﬀerent between participating or not to the
contracts. As before, the full information allocation is attained at the tangency point of the
iso-proﬁt curve ΠF and the regulator’s indiﬀerence curve W.
The proposition tells that if the full information level of employment in the least hiring capable
ﬁrm , L∗
l is suﬃciently close to its free level LF
l (see (al) in the ﬁgure), then the full information
contract will be incentive compatible and will respect the participation constraints. This remains
true as long as L∗
l ≤ LP.
Corollary 1. The likelihood of a class (a) economic situation with attainable full information
contracts increases as the distortion in the labour market decreases, as the shadow cost of public
funding increases and as the decreases in the lowest type’s returns to scale of labour is more
important.
Proof:
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The occurrence of class (a) depends on whether the condition L∗
l (w,ws,λ;θl) ≤ LP(w;θl,θ h)
is satisﬁed. On the one hand, we remarked in section 3 that L∗
l decreased as λ increased and
w
ws decreased. Therefore the chance to a satisﬁed condition is greater. On the other hand, larger
decreases in the lowest type’s returns to scale of labour implies lower marginal revenues to labour
and then lower levels of employment L∗
l at full information. In the ﬁgure 3, this means that the




The class (a) of incentive contracts allows to promote the socially eﬃcient levels of employment
in all types of ﬁrms in the economy. Moreover these include no deadweight transfers. When
the condition for such a class of contracts is not satisﬁed, some ineﬃciency and some deadweight
can occur. The next section will demonstrate that, when optimal contracts are proposed by the
regulator, the source of deadweight lies in the information rent that the private ﬁrm holds about
its hiring capability.
4.2 Information Rent as a Source of Deadweight
When the condition for the full information contracts is not satisﬁed, the problem becomes a
basic adverse selection problem. As in the basic models, a menu of contracts {(Ll,t l),(Lh,t h)} is
proposed to the private ﬁrm by the regulator. The highest type is characterized by an eﬃcient
level of employment and gets a positive or null information rent while the lowest type is induced
to an ineﬃcient level and gets only its reservation proﬁt. We will characterize such a menu of
contracts in the current and following sections.
When the condition to obtain a full information allocation is not satisﬁed, we have the following
proposition:
Proposition 3. If L∗
l (w,ws,λ;θl) >L P(w;θl,θ h) then (a) levels of employment are monotonicly
ranked: Ll ≤ Lh, (b) PCl is binding, (c) ICh is binding and (d) ICl is slack (e) PCh may be slack
or binding.
The proof is presented in the Appendix A. The speciﬁcity of this proof lies in the existence of
non constant reservation proﬁts ΠF
h and ΠF
l in the participation constraints. These require that
L∗
l >L P in order to get the binding constraints as speciﬁed here, otherwise the full information
contract is achievable.
By this proposition we can restrict our attention to the problem where only the constraints
(ICh) and (PCl) are binding and where the constraint (ICl) is slack. The constraint (PCh)m a y
be binding or slack. The regulator has the following reduced program:
PIC max
{Ll,Lh,tl,th}
p[PQ(θl,L l) − wsLl − λtl]+( 1− p)[PQ(θh,L h) − wsLh − λth]
s. t.
PCl : PQ(θl,L l) − wLl + tl =Π F
l
ICh : PQ(θh,L h) − wLh + th = PQ(θh,L l) − wLl + tl
PCh : PQ(θh,L h) − wLh + th ≥ ΠF
h (μ)
where μ is the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier of (PCh).
The Superscript ∗∗ will denote the optimal values of this program. By rearranging the two last
constraints we get the expressions of proﬁts and transfers as functions of the free proﬁts:
Π∗∗(θl)=Π F
l (9)
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Π∗∗(θh)=Π F




l − [PQ(θl,L ∗∗





h ) − wL∗∗
h ]+Φ ( L∗∗
l ) (12)
The term Φ(L∗∗
l ) is the information rent that the regulator must give to the ﬁrm such that the
highest type does not mimic the lowest type.9 The information rent is expressed as:
Φ(Ll)=[ ( PQ(θh,L l) − wLl) − ΠF
h] − [(PQ(θl,L l) − wLl) − ΠF
l ]
or, after simpliﬁcation,
Φ(Ll)=[ PQ(θh,L l) − PQ(θl,L l)] − [ΠF
h − ΠF
l ] (13)
As the ﬁrst expression shows, the information rent corresponds to the diﬀerence in losses of
proﬁt, (PQ(θ,Ll) − wLl) − ΠF, between the two types of ﬁrms if the regulator imposed a level
of employment Ll. The information rent increases with the level of employment in the ﬁrm θl.




The intuition here is that, as the high type has larger returns to scale of labour, its extra-proﬁt
increases faster than the low type. So, does the information rent.
Note ﬁnally that at the pooling level of employment LP,Φ ( LP
l ) = 0; at any Ll >L P,Φ ( Ll) > 0.
From the equations (9)-(12) we observe that the lowest type gets the free proﬁt as in the
regulation free situation. It receives a transfer that exactly compensates the loss in proﬁt due to
the contracted level of employment L∗∗
l , as it was the case with full information. It is indiﬀerent
between participating or not to the contract: there is thus no deadweight transfer. On the other
side, the highest type has a proﬁt level above its free proﬁts: it receives an information rent. This
rent makes it prefer the contract (Lh,t h) to the contract (Ll,t l) and thus the rent induce the ﬁrm
to reveal its true type. Since the highest type always prefers the contract (Lh,t h) to no contract
at all, there will be a deadweight transfer that corresponds to the information rent.
4.3 The Condition for Deadweight Spending
The previous section has presented that the information rent can be the source of deadweight
transfer. It did not tell that this rent was always positive. The current section shows that it can
be null in particular economic situations. To demonstrate this, we develop the formal solution of
the program PIC .
Using (12) the participation constraint (PCh) can be rewritten as follows:
PCh :Φ ( Ll) ≥ 0( μ)
The Lagrangian of the problem is written in the following form (where we removed the Super-
script ** for readability) :
9It induces the lowest (highest) type to choose the contract (Ll,t l)( ( Lh,t h)). By observing the chosen contract,
the regulator can infer the type of the ﬁrm. In this sense, those are separating contracts.
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L = p[PQ(θl,L l) − wsLl]+( 1− p)[PQ(θh,L h) − wsLh]
+pλ[ΠF
l − (PQ(θl,L l) − wLl) ]+( 1− p)λ[ΠF
h − (PQ(θh,L h) − wLh)]
−(1 − p)λΦ(Ll)
−μΦ(Ll)
The First Order conditions are obtained by diﬀerentiating L by Ll and Lh. The optimal levels
of employment L∗∗
l and L∗∗
h are given by
PQL(θh,L ∗∗
h ) − ws = λ [w − PQL(θh,L ∗∗
h )] (15)
PQL(θl,L ∗∗








We have now two classes of contracts depending on whether the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier μ is
positive or null.
Class (b) In this class of contracts μ>0 and PCh is binding. Thus, by (10),
Π∗∗(θh)=Π F




Therefore, by deﬁnition (8) of the pooling level of employment, L∗∗
l = LP(w;θl,θ h). This
expresses that there is no point for the regulator to diminish L∗∗
l beyond the pooling level of
employment LP.
The ﬁrst order condition (15) holds and is identical to equation (6 ) in the full information
setting. It expresses that the expected marginal social surplus yielded by the highest type of
ﬁrm should equate the expected marginal transfer to make this ﬁrm participate voluntarily. The
optimal level of employment is then L∗∗
h = L∗
h(w,ws,λ;θl).
As both participation constraints bind, no ﬁrm earns more than its free proﬁt ΠF, there is
no information rent and no deadweight transfer. The transfer for the most capable hiring ﬁrm
is the full information transfer t∗
h and, by (11 ), the transfer for the least capable ﬁrm is tP ≡
ΠF
l − [PQ(θl,L P) − wLP].
All these developments lead us to the following proposition:
Proposition 4. In class (b) incentive contracts, the level of employment in the most hiring capable
ﬁrm is the optimal level in full information: L∗∗
h = L∗
h(w,ws,λ;θl). The level of employment
in the least capable ﬁrm is distorted downward and equal to the pooling level of employment:
L∗∗
l = LP(w;θl,θ h). The transfers do not include any deadweight.
Class (c) In this class of contracts μ = 0 and PCh is slack. By (10) that means that Φ(L∗∗
l ) > 0.
Since Φ(L) increases in L and Φ(LP) = 0, then
L∗∗
l >L P (17)
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The optimal level of employment is always larger that the pooling level of employment in the
class (c) contracts.
The ﬁrst order condition (15) for the highest type of ﬁrm does not depends on μ. The optimal
level of employment L∗∗
h for the highest type is the same as in class (b).
The ﬁrst order condition (16) for the lowest type does however matter as it now determines the
level of employment for the lowest type. It has the following form:
PQL(θl,L ∗∗








This equation expresses that, at the margin, the regulator must make the trade-oﬀ between
the cost of information rent Φ(L∗∗
l ) - the cost of deadweight transfer - and the cost in social
surplus through the decrease in L∗∗




l (w,ws,λ;θl,θ h,p) is the solution of this equation.
The following proposition collects these results for class (c)and describes how the levels of
employment vary with the parameter of the economy.
Proposition 5. In class (a) incentive contracts, the most hiring capable ﬁrm achieves the full
information level of employment L∗∗
h = L∗
h, while the least capable one is proposed a level of
employment lower than the full information level: Lic
l (w,ws,λ;θl,θ h,p) <L ∗
l (w,ws,λ;θl).I t
decreases with lower ws, with higher λ, with higher θh, and with lower p.
Proof: Indeed, the equality (6) can be multiplied by p,
pPQL(θ,L) − ws = pλ(w − PQL(θ,L))
at L = L∗. We compare it to (16). By (14), d
dLl Φ(L∗∗




l (w,ws,λ;θl,θ h,p) according to the parameter ws, λ, θh and p are obtained
by diﬀerentiating (18). We do not provide the computation in this text.
Q.E.D
The intuition behind the last statement in the proposition is the following one. Lower distortion
ws implies smaller intervention from the regulator. The employment in the least hiring capable
ﬁrm is therefore less supported. Larger cost of public fund means that the regulator will be also
less incline to support this employment. Higher parameter (θh) in the production function of the
most hiring capable ﬁrm will make this ﬁrm more attractive for the regulator. The regulator will
desire to reduce further the employment in the least hiring capable ﬁrm in order to diminish the
information rent further. Finally, the level of employment Lic
l decreases when the probability p of
the least hiring capable ﬁrm (θl) decreases. The smaller the probability of this ﬁrm, the smaller
weight in the regulator puts on it and less incline is the regulator to loose some employment - and
consequently some welfare - in this type of ﬁrm.
The transfers are given by (11 ) and (12 ).
tic
l =Π F
l − [PQ(θl,L ic






h +Φ ( Lic
l )=t∗
h +Φ ( Lic
l )
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The last equality expresses that the transfer to the most hiring capable ﬁrm includes some
deadweight.
The next section will summarize and explain the three classes of incentive contracts we have
just obtained.
4.4 Three Classes of Incentive Contracts
We can now summarize the three classes of incentive contracts in the following table. Two ﬁrst
columns give the states of the participation and incentive constraints of the highest hiring capable
ﬁrm. The next columns present the forms of incentive contracts and the last column shows the
expected value of the deadweight spending EDWS (or information rent) to the private ﬁrm.










(b) binding binding {LP,t P}{ L∗
h,t ∗
h} 0




h +Φ ( Lic
l )} (1 − p)Φ(Lic
l )
Table 1: Three Classes of Incentive Contracts
This table shows that only class (c) introduces some deadweight spending in the form of infor-
mation rent (1 − p)Φ(Lic
l ) to the most hiring capable ﬁrm. The transfers are otherwise transfers
with no deadweight since this ﬁrm’s participation constraints (PCl) and (PCh) are binding. The
ﬁrm is then indiﬀerent between participating to the contract or not.
The level of employment in most capable ﬁrm is always the optimal level with full information:
there is no distortion introduced by the asymmetry of information over the ﬁrm’s hiring capability.
In the least capable ﬁrm, the levels of employment are distorted downwards for classes (b) and
(c). This is the consequence of the regulator’s desire to reduce the information rent to the most
capable ﬁrm at the cost of some employment reduction in the least capable one.
The contracts corresponding to these three classes are displayed in ﬁgure 4. The full information
levels {(al),(ah)} are reached where the slopes of the iso-proﬁt curves (Π) are small. At this level,
by tangency, the slope of the iso-welfare (W) are small, too. (This is depicted only for (ah).) This
indicates a weak marginal social surplus from employment, which characterizes a weak distortion
in the labour market or a large shadow cost of public fund.
The incentive contracts {(bl),(bh)} and {(cl),(ch)} are reached for higher slopes of iso-proﬁt
curve. The diﬀerence between the two classes of contract lies in the weight the regulator puts on
the least hiring capable ﬁrm. In the class (c) the regulator makes a trade-oﬀ between reducing the
information rent to the most hiring capable ﬁrm and reducing the employment level of the least
capable ﬁrm. In class (b), the regulator attaches a smaller weight on the least capable ﬁrm because
it is unfrequent. The regulator is then willing to reduce much employment in this unfrequent ﬁrm
in order to decrease the cost of highly probable information rent to other ﬁrm. He decreases this
employment down to the level LP. Any decrease beyond this level is ineﬃcient to him since the
information rent can no more be reduced.
We may now question in which economic situations the various classes of incentive contracts oc-
cur. In the previous text, we have deﬁned three important levels of employment for the least hiring
capable ﬁrm: the level of employment L∗
l (w,ws,λ;θl) in the full information contract, the pooling
level LP(w;θl,θ h) for the incentive contract with no deadweight and the level Lic
l (w,ws,λ;θl,θ h,p)
for the incentive contract with deadweight (solution of (18)). All these levels depends on the (dif-
ferent) sets of parameters of the economy: w,ws,λ;θl,θ h,p. We may now make the following
14L L L L
lll l
F F F F
L L L L
h h h h
F F F F L L L L
lll l
p p p p
t t t t
L L L L
∏ ∏ ∏ ∏
h h h h
III IC C C C
L L L L
h h h h
* * * ** * * * L L L L
h h h h
* * * *￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
= L L L L
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿l l
* * * *￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
∏ ∏ ∏ ∏
lll l
F F F F
∏ ∏ ∏ ∏
h h h h￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
F F F F
( ( ( (c c c c        ) ) ) ) lll l
( ( ( (c c c c        ) ) ) ) h h h h
( ( ( (b b b b       ) ) ) ) lll l
( ( ( (b b b b       ) ) ) ) h h h h
( ( ( (a a a a        ) ) ) ) lll l
( ( ( (a a a a        ) ) ) ) h h h h
* * * *
W W W W
Figure 4:
proposition that collects the results of the current and the previous sections.
Proposition 6.
• If L∗
l (w,ws,λ;θl) ≤ LP(w;θl,θ h), the regulator can implement Class (a) incentive contracts.
These contracts include no deadweight spending.
• If L∗
l (w,ws,λ;θl) >L P(w;θl,θ h) and LP(w;θl,θ h) ≥ Lic
l (w,ws,λ;θl,θ h,p), the regulator
can implement Class (b) incentive contracts. These include also no deadweight transfer.
• Otherwise, the regulator must implement Class (c) incentive contracts which include some
deadweight transfer to the private ﬁrm. The forms of the corresponding incentive contracts
are given in table 1.
The ﬁrst condition in the proposition is demonstrated through the section 4.1. The second
condition is elaborated in the discussion of μ in section 4.3.10
The current results are imprecise about the eﬀect that each parameter of the economy have
on the deadweight spending. As we have obtained no general results we turn to an example to
highlight these eﬀects.
4.5 Example
We can characterize the welfare value of these contracts as function of the market distortion in
the labour market w
ws, the belief over the types of ﬁrms p and (1 − p), and the spread in types
10A ﬁnal discussion of this section carries over the impact of the private ﬁrm’s reservation proﬁts. The classic
literature in regulation proposes adverse selection models where the participation constraints include constant reser-
vation values. In our particular application, the private ﬁrms’ reservation values diﬀer according to the ﬁrms’s types.
The most hiring capable ﬁrm has a larger reservation value since its proﬁt when it is free from regulation is higher
than this of the least capable ﬁrm. The impact of these varying reservation values is analyzed in the Appendix A.
We can brieﬂy show this by analyzing the form of the information rent. We write it here again:
Φ(Ll)=[ PQ(θh,L l) − PQ(θl,L l)] − [ΠF
h − ΠF
l ]
The diﬀerence between our model and the classic models with constant reservation values lies in the presence of
the diﬀerence in free proﬁts [ΠF
h − ΠF
l ]. As this grows, the information rent decreases. The impact of asymmetric
information is therefore diminished.
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s ≡ θh−θl
θl . Let us ﬁx the spread and exploit the example of a price taker ﬁrm with productivity
Q = θ
√
L where θ is a productivity parameter. The price of the product is set to P =1 .
The full information class (a) occurs when LP >L ∗









This means that the distortion in the labour market, w











The class (b) occurs when LP >L ic









The probability ˜ p is the regulator’s maximum belief on the least hiring capable ﬁrm that allows
him to propose an incentive contract with no deadweight. This probability increases with larger
λ and s but with lower w
ws. A larger cost of public fund λ or a larger spread will imply a larger
diﬀerence between the optimal levels of employment in the two types of ﬁrm. The regulator will
be more enticed to reduce the employment in the least capable ﬁrm down to LP. This will lead to
a class (b) contract. Finally a lower distortion in the labour market, w
ws, means that the regulator
desires to promote less employment, in particular within the least hiring capable ﬁrm. The optimal
level of employment in this ﬁrm may become suﬃciently low so that the most capable ﬁrm is not
induced to mimic the least capable one. There will be no information rent and then no deadweight
spending. This is again the class (b).
In the other case, we achieve an incentive contract with non null information rent (class (c)).
The following graph depicts the three possible classes for various believes and intensities of
distortion in the labour market. It is remarkable that the regulator can implement contracts with
transfer with no deadweight in the classes (a) and (b).
In this particular example, we can note that when s → 0, our model with a discrete distribution
of types is transformed into a model with a continuous distribution of types and the boundary
( ˜ w
ws) → 0. The class (a) disappears and the full information contracts are no more possible. We
expect therefore to loose this property in the continuous type model.
In this example, the intersect X between the two limit curves drifts to the North as the spread
s, increases. This means that the class (c) shrinks as the ﬁrms are more and more diﬀerentiated by
their types. Therefore the economic situations in which transfers with no deadweight are possible,
become more probable. The intuition is that, within this particular example, a larger spread will
involve a larger diﬀerence in the free proﬁts and will augment the likelihood of contracts with no
deadweight transfer.
The current results focus on the optimal incentive contracts of private ﬁrms with diﬀerent hiring
capabilities. The regulator lacked information on the ﬁrm’s productivity parameter and could not
observe the ﬁrm before oﬀering the contracts. We now turn to the situation where the regulator
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5 Ex-Ante Observation of the Level of Employment
In the previous section, we made the hypothesis that the regulator could not observe ex-ante the
level of employment in each private ﬁrm. We assumed that the regulator ”blindly” oﬀered incentive
contracts because we wanted to make clear the link between deadweight spending, eﬃciency and
information rent. We will now modify the model such that the regulator observes each ﬁrm’s level
of employment before the incentive contract is signed.
The problem becomes one of selecting the private ﬁrm with the largest hiring capability among
those having the same free level of employment LF. This model can be viewed as an adverse
selection problem based on the increase in the ﬁrm’s employment ΔL = L − LF instead of the
absolute level of employment L as in the previous section. The regulator can now check the
diﬀerence between the achieved level of employment L and the observed free level LF. This ex-ante
observation provides some information about the various parameters unknown to the regulator. In
fact, it will help to determinate one of these parameters but still some other parameters will have
to be revealed through the incentive contract.
The role of ex-ante observation becomes clear when we assume two kinds of information: θ
and γ. The ﬁrm’s revenue becomes PQ(θ,γ,L) while its proﬁt function is transformed to Π =
PQ(θ,γ,L) − wL + t. When the ﬁrm is free from regulation, the transfer t is null and the ﬁrm
chooses the free level of employment LF such that PQL(θ,γ,LF)=w. This equality gives a
relation between θ, γ and LF that we express as γ = γ(LF,θ). After the observation of LF the
regulator can infer the ﬁrm’s proﬁt: Π = PQ(θ,γ(LF,θ),L) − wL+ t. This is a function of θ and
L and the problem is identical to this of the previous sections.11
The contracts with ex-ante observation can be explained in the ﬁgure 6. As this ﬁgure shows,
the nature of the asymmetric information relates now to the concavity of the iso-proﬁt curve and
thus to the importance of decreasing returns to scale of labour. (There is no longer a translation
eﬀect between the curves, as in the previous section.) When they are free from regulation both
ﬁrms’ iso-proﬁt curves intersect at the same level of employment LF(= LF
l = LF
h) and the ﬁrm
with the largest (lower) hiring capability is characterized by the ﬂatter (steepest) iso-proﬁt curve.
In this particular model we get the following proposition:
Proposition 7. If the regulator ex-ante observes the free level of employment, LF,
• the full information contracts (class a) can never be reached.
• If the probability p of the lowest type of ﬁrm is low, a menu of incentive contracts with no
11A minor diﬀerence lies in the violation of the Single Crossing Property (3): QLθ(θ,L)=0a tL = LF. However,
as long as this property holds for other levels of employment L  = LF our model still remain valid.
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Figure 6:
information rent (class b) can be achieved.
• Otherwise a menu of incentive contracts with non null information rent must be implemented
(class c).
• Non additional transfers are only available in (class b) and correspond to contracts that
disregard the lowest type.
Proof:
We content ourselves to the informal proof since this results can easily be obtained from the
previous sections and ﬁgure 6. Remark that the pooling level of employment LP is pushed down
to LP = LF. Note then that the lowest type’s full information level of employment is such that
LP ≤ Lic
l . Indeed, the hypothesis on the social surplus implies that the regulator will always gain
from increasing Ll above LF. Therefore, the occurrence of class (a) is impossible.
At LP = LF, the transfer to the lowest type is t∗∗
l = O and the lowest type is at equilibrium.
By application of the previous proposition, the class (b) corresponds to the menu of contracts
{(LF,0),(L∗
h,t ∗
h)}. On one side, it would decrease the social surplus. On the other side, any
reduction of Ll below the level LP would necessitate an increase in the transfer and thus an
increase in the social cost. There is thus no gain for the regulator to decrease Ll below LP. The
class (c) is has the same characteristics.
Q.E.D
Note that the Class (b) contracts discards the lowest type since the latter always receives a null
transfer and never participates.
To conclude, we note that the results for incentive contracts with ex-ante observation of the
free level of employment are similar to those of the previous model. However, on one hand ex-ante
observation withdraws the possibility of full information outcome (class (a)) so that transfers with
no deadweight are less probable to occur. On the other hand this ex-ante observation provides
more information on the ﬁrms’ characteristics, it would also reduce the size of information rent
and thus the importance the deadweight transfers in class (c).
Finally, we note an inconsistency in this model. The observation of the free level of employment
means that the private ﬁrms exist before the contracts are proposed. This breaks the hypothesis of
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one-shot (or static) game. The introduction of dynamics in the model will imply strategic behaviors
of the ﬁrms on their levels of employment but also on the information revelation strategies 12.
6 Extensions
In this paper we applied strong hypotheses about the private ﬁrm. How robust is this model to
relaxing these? A ﬁrst step is to relax the assumption on the ﬁrm behavior in the product market.
When the ﬁrm is a monopoly, the same model can easily be adapted by considering the new
revenue function P(Q(θ,L)) Q(θ,L) instead of PQ (θ,L). The same conclusions will be derived.
The additional speciﬁcity will be the regulator’s intervention against the monopoly’s power in the
product market. This element has extensively been discussed in the literature and is not developed
here.
We can also relax the hypothesis on the nature of the type θ. We assumed that it described a
production parameter. The introduction of a parameter about the demand function is trivial and
the results will be similar. However, we note that this parameter should monotonically rank the
ﬁrm’s revenue, which might be an unrealistic property.
Other relevant extensions must be reported. As presented in the previous section, the private
ﬁrm’s strategic behavior and the regulator’s commitment are important. The ﬁrm can strategically
modify any ex-ante characteristic in order to increase its proﬁt from the contracts. Also, in a
repeated relationship, the regulator might not be able to commit in the long run. A ratchet eﬀect
will appear such that the ﬁrm will avoid to reveal all its information in the ﬁrst period as required in
the current model. We can mention the example of a highly capital intensive ﬁrm which contracts
with the regulator for a speciﬁed increase in employment and a speciﬁed annual subsidy. Within
our model, the regulator is able to know all the ﬁrm’s private information after the ﬁrst period.
He has then the incentive to break his commitment and to grant minimal transfers in the next
periods. Will the ﬁrm still make the investment linked to the speciﬁed increase in employment?
Finally, a major but diﬃcult extension of this model would be the introduction of peer ﬁrms.
When several private ﬁrms are (imperfectly) competing in the product market, a subsidy to one
ﬁrm aﬀects the others. The following questions arise: what are the characteristics of optimal
contracts when we monitor employment in a speciﬁc industry? Can the information obtained from
one ﬁrm be used to infer the type of the other ﬁrm when the types of the ﬁrms are correlated?
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APPENDIX A:
Rename the revenue PQ(θ,L)b yR(θ,L). By the deﬁnition of LP the inequality Ll >L P is
equivalent to [PQ(θh,L P) − ΠF
h] − [PQ(θl,L P) − ΠF





h ) the solution of program PIC . The proposition to prove becomes then:
Proposition. Assume θh >θ l and RLθ > 0. Levels of employment are monotonic: (a) L∗∗
l ≤ L∗∗
h .






We proove that L∗∗
l >L ∗∗
h is a contradiction.
Suppose L∗∗
l >L ∗∗
h .I fICl and ICh could be satisﬁed, then the sum of ICl and ICh could be
satisﬁed, too :
(R(θh,L ∗∗
l ) − R(θh,L ∗∗
h )) − (R(θl,L ∗∗
l ) − R(θl,L ∗∗
h )) ≤ 0
Which contradicts the single crossing property RLθ > 0.
(b) If Φ(L∗∗
l ) > 0, then PCl binds :
We prove here that, if Φ(L∗∗
l ) ≥ 0 and if PCl is not binding then PCh is not binding and the
transfers t∗∗
l and t∗∗
h are not optimal for the regulator.
Suppose PCl is not binding at the optimum, i.e. R(θl,L ∗∗
l ) − wL∗∗
l + t∗∗
l > ΠF
l . Add the
inequality Φ(L∗∗
l ) > 0 from hypothesis and get R(θh,L ∗∗





h ) − wL∗∗
h + t∗∗
h >R (θh,L ∗∗
l ) − wL∗∗
l + t∗∗
l > ΠF
h. The ﬁrst and last term of this chain
of inequalities correspond to the constraint PCh. So, none of the participation constraints are
binding. It is possible to gain some welfare by reducing t∗∗
l and t∗∗





l ) > 0, then ICh binds :
We prove that, if Φ(L∗∗
l ) > 0 then, if ICh does not bind then PCh does not bind and th is not
an optimal transfer.
If ICh is not binding, then R(θh,L ∗∗
h ) − wL∗∗
h + t∗∗
h >R (θh,L ∗∗
l ) − wL∗∗
l + t∗∗
l . Add the
inequality Φ(L∗∗
l ) > 0, then R(θh,L ∗∗
h ) − wL∗∗
h + t∗∗
h +Φ ( L∗∗
l ) >R (θh,L ∗∗




h ) − wL∗∗
h + t∗∗
h > ΠF
h +( R(θh,L ∗∗
l ) − wL∗∗
l + t∗∗
l − ΠF
l ) > ΠF
h, as the parenthesis
in the middle term corresponds the PCl constraint and is positive or null. So, we have that PCh
and ICh are not binding. Ceteris paribus, the regulator can therefore reduce t∗∗
h and gain some
welfare : the transfer t∗∗
h is not optimal.
(d) If Φ(L∗∗
l ) > 0, then ICl does not bind :
We prove here that, if ICl binds, then by the single crossing property RLθ > 0, ICh cannot
bind, which contracdicts the previous paragraph.
Suppose ICl is binding, then R(θl,L ∗∗
l ) − wL∗∗
l + t∗∗
l = R(θl,L ∗∗
h ) − wL∗∗
h + t∗∗
h .B yRLθ > 0,
R(θh,L ∗∗
l ) − R(θl,L ∗∗
l ) >R (θh,L ∗∗
h ) − R(θl,L ∗∗




l >R (θh,L ∗∗
h ) − wL∗∗
h + t∗∗
h , that is ICl is not satisﬁed, which is a contradiction.
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The reader may wonder what happens when Φ(L∗∗
l ) < 0. In this situation, the constraints
PCl and PCh are binding, but none of the constraints ICh and ICl are binding.The level of
employment L∗∗
l is not optimal since the regulator can increase L∗∗
l without modifying the states
of the constraints. He can increase it up to the level LP where Φ(LP) = 0. In fact as will be
dicussed later, there is no point to decrease L∗∗
l below LP.
Q.E.D
22